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THE RUBRIC OF FORCE: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE
CONTEXT OF SUBTLE BIASES AND JUDICIAL HOSTILITY
By Anand Swaminathan*

W

hen the United States Supreme Court instructed lower federal courts to enforce Brown
v. Board of Education1 “with all deliberate
speed,” it made “vagueness and gradualism” its
official policy for social advancement.2 Fifty years along the
path of gradualism, has our society lost the ability to make continuing progress in combating racial discrimination?
I argue that we have abandoned our commitment to the
quest for equal treatment, largely because we have failed to understand the evolving nature of discrimination. In this article, I
raise the notion of “force” as an overarching theme that provides
a means by which to understand the subtler nature of today’s
discrimination and provides renewed justification for the legal
regime used to combat it. This article situates the notion of
force within the employment discrimination context, partly to
define a reasonable and representative scope of study, but also in
response to the rich debate over the last ten years as to whether
Title VII and other statutes regulating discrimination in the
workplace should exist at all.

THE NOTION OF FORCE
According to civil libertarian legal scholar Richard Epstein,
Title VII is counterproductive because its inefficiencies cause
the overall economic pie to shrink, as companies hire fewer
workers and thereby decrease opportunities for those meant to
benefit from antidiscrimination laws.3 Epstein argues that the
market, operating without restrictions, would solve the problem
of discrimination by accruing competitive advantage to those
who do not maintain discriminatory practices. In Epstein’s
view, what small amount of discrimination remains is both tolerable and, in fact, productive.4
Richard McAdams presents an alternative economic theory
of discrimination termed status-production,5 which posits that
“discrimination and racist behavior generally are processes by
which one racial group seeks to produce esteem for itself by
lowering the status of another group.”6 Within this theory,
McAdams argues that discrimination will persist in competitive
markets even though discrimination is, from an economic perspective, inefficient and decreases overall wealth because it results in a diversion of resources and deadweight loss.7
McAdams presents three explanations as to why discrimination
will persist in competitive markets: (1) the power of discriminatory social norms, (2) the existence of “reciprocity” (restricting
social contact to ingroup members) between whites, and (3) under certain circumstances, the effect of esteem-producing racial
biases.8 According to McAdams, “the key to understanding
[discrimination and racist behavior generally] is to perceive its
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subordinating quality. Status comes about by disparaging others, by asserting and reinforcing a claim to superior social
rank.”9 These explanations highlight an important point: subordinating another group achieves greater esteem for the subordinator by denying the very act of derogation; hence, subtler forms
of discrimination are more effective than overt ones.
Epstein’s associational theory, by presenting a world in
which individuals look innately within their own groups to develop personal connections, lacks any coercive effect. On the
other hand, McAdams’ theory focuses quite acutely on the programmatic domination of one group by another. This focus on
force is crucial to the debate because it is force that provides the
strongest justification for state intervention. Epstein concedes
that state intervention was needed in the Jim Crow South, reasoning that the explicit use of physical violence and coercion
kept blacks from participating in markets.10 In his view, the
distinction between that period and the present one is the absence of state-sponsored force, a shift he identifies as occurring
in 1954 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education. I argue that Brown merely required a change in the
form of force. In a way, the coercive force has moved underground, and McAdams’ status production theory lays the foundation for a more thorough explanation of discriminatory behavior.
While McAdams’ language sounds of deliberateness, or
premeditation, in this article I consider the growing evidence
that subconscious biases contribute to discriminatory outcomes,
and place this dynamic within the broader notion of force. In
doing so, I reject Epstein’s sterile, almost placid, treatment of
these phenomena as part of innate associational “preferences” or
“tastes.” Epstein states that Brown led to cultural and social
changes to the very fabric of the South and asserts that this
change resulted in a drastic reduction in the use of force that
eliminated the need for legal intervention in combating discrimination. He does not consider the possibility that previously acceptable behaviors would not be abandoned but rather replaced
by new, subtler forms of subordination. To establish the persistence of force through new forms, then, would be to lay a strong
challenge at the feet of Epstein and others who concede that
state intervention was warranted in the Jim Crow South, but
argue that such intervention is no longer needed today.

LINGERING FORCE: COGNITIVE
BIASES AND IMPLICIT ATTITUDES
The discriminatory behavior of whites in McAdams’ theory
is understood as serving to produce and maintain social status.
To this end, despite the influence of competitive markets, whites
21

use discriminatory social norms and what McAdams terms reciprocity. This behavior of whites, in McAdams’ approach, is
treated as purposeful or intentional. However, these same
means, and resulting end, may be compounded by implicit attitudes and unintentional motivations. Indeed, they may even be
the result of healthy cognitive functioning. A study of these
forms will buttress McAdams’ theory of status production while
providing further evidence of ongoing force unaccounted for in,
and contrary to, Epstein’s assumptions.
COGNITIVE BIASES AS FORCE
Linda Hamilton Krieger’s 1995 article, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, presents a detailed study of
behavioral research on cognitive biases and their implications on
established legal doctrine.11 Krieger explains that in the 1970s,
psychologists began to recognize that intergroup biases could
result not only from motivational processes but also from typical
cognitive processes. Called social cognition theory, psychologists began to identify “normal” cognitive processes like categorization and information processing that could also create and
reinforce racial biases.12 According to this view, stereotyping is
a cognitive process, resembling categorization, that alters perception, interpretation and other forms of information processing in predictable ways.13
Social cognition theory suggests that individuals who may
not harbor racist beliefs may nonetheless suffer from unintended
but systematic prejudice as a result of categorization-like stereotypes. Behavioral experiments have shown that when individuals are divided into groups, even for trivial or random reasons,
they display strong biases in their perception of differences and
in the evaluation and reward of ingroup versus outgroup members.14 Subjects perceive ingroup members as more similar and
outgroup members as more different than when those same persons are viewed in the absence of groupings. In addition, subjects are better able to recall undesirable behavior when committed by outgroup members instead of ingroup members, significantly overrate the product of their own group in comparison to
that of outgroups, and disproportionately attribute ingroup members’ failures to situational factors (i.e. environmental or contextual factors) and outgroup members’ failures to dispositional
factors (i.e. personal attributes or traits).15
In addition to categorization-based biases, social cognition
theorists have also identified biases resulting from saliencebased cognitive distortions in perception and memory. Studies
have found that individuals judge the actions of minorities in
more extreme ways when they are token members of a group
than when they are members of a fully integrated group.16 In
one study, white males and females evaluated law school applications containing incidental indications of the applicants’ race.
Evaluators judged black applicants with strong credentials more
favorably than otherwise identical white applicants, and judged
black applicants with weak credentials less favorably than otherwise identical white applicants.17
22

According to some theorists, these studies show that we pay
more attention to stimulus objects that are more salient or distinctive, and as a result more information about these objects is
perceived, encoded and stored in memory.18 Thus, because data
regarding such stimuli are more available to the perceiver, impressions formed under conditions of high attention have a
greater valence, positive or negative, explaining the polarized
evaluation phenomena.19 An alternative explanation of the polarization findings incorporates previous studies showing that
individuals perceive ingroup members as relatively heterogeneous, or complex, while they view outgroup members as relatively homogeneous.20 As a result, they have an increased appreciation of complexities in evaluating ingroup members and
greater awareness of the inadequacy of available information,21
and thus are more cautious in their judgments.22 In contrast,
evaluations of undifferentiated outgroup members are more
broad and inexact, generally either “good” or “bad.”23
The studies above regarding categorization and salience
constitute cognitive sources of stereotypes and schemas, acting
as a lens through which subsequent events are viewed. How do
these schemas influence behavior? A 1980 study using schoolage children examined the effect of social schemas on the interpretation of ambiguous information, presenting cartoon drawings and verbal descriptions of a scene in which one student was
poking a classmate in the back with a pencil.24 Asked to rate the
behavior of the offending student, the study found that switching
the race of the actor had a significant impact on the manner in
which the children categorized the behavior. Specifically, subjects judged the behavior of black actors to be more mean and
threatening, and less playful and friendly, while the opposite
result obtained when the actor was white.25
A further example of schematic distortion affects how we
attribute causes to events. This analysis expands upon research
regarding “fundamental attribution error,” in which people tend
to underestimate the impact of situational factors and overestimate the impact of dispositional factors.26 A variation on this,
known as the “ultimate attribution error,” relates directly to the
categorization-based biases identified above, showing that people tend to attribute desirable ingroup behaviors to internal, dispositional factors but attribute similar behavior by outgroup
members to environmental causes.27 One such study found that
subjects perceived misconduct to be more likely to recur where
the behavior was in accordance with stereotypes of the actor’s
ethnicity than when stereotype-inconsistent or stereotypeneutral.
Furthermore, when misconduct was stereotypeinconsistent or stereotype-neutral, subjects were better able to
recall information about surrounding life circumstances of the
transgressor.28
In the employment setting, the implications of these studies
on how cognitive processes shape perceptions and influence
behavior are numerous. Racial minorities are more likely to be
alienated as a result of overperceived differences and are more
likely to have their work undervalued as compared to that of
majority (ingroup) members. In addition, any mistakes they
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make at work weigh more heavily in their supervisors’ minds
and are more likely to be attributed to personal, and not situational, factors, and hence result in more negative personal judgments. These concerns are only exacerbated by salience-based
distortions, such that racial minorities in predominantly white
employment settings are susceptible to evaluation in the extremes. While the data also shows that their successes are also
viewed more positively, the net effect may only be more alienation from co-workers.
In this setting, where there appears to be little room for error for racial minorities in the cognitive minds of their employers, the studies also show that minorities do not get the benefit
of the doubt. Instead, in the plethora of ambiguous circumstances that can arise in the workplace, existing schema and
causal distortions will act to place a thumb on the scale against
minority employees. That is, it is likely that a racial minority
involved in a verbal dispute in the workplace will not be seen as
passionate or playful but aggressive and threatening; and, this
aggressive and threatening behavior is more likely to be attributed to individual character than surrounding circumstances. In
this way, the conduct will appear worse, present less opportunity
for mitigation or rehabilitation, and thus result in more drastic
consequences. Without ever injecting motivational or intentional racial attitudes, cognitive biases present the possibility of
just such a playing field. This series of cognitive operations in
the minds of employers did not cease the day Brown v. Board of
Education was decided, nor did it cease the following day.
IMPLICIT ATTITUDES
The operation of force via subtle, often subconscious and unknowing, discrimination is further evidenced through tests
measuring explicit versus implicit attitudes. Generally, these
tests show that even individuals who believe that they hold no
prejudices towards racial minorities nonetheless harbor such
negative attitudes at a strikingly high rate.29 Unlike the cognitive bias studies discussed above, which focused on biascreating effects (or byproducts) of otherwise normal cognitive
functioning, implicit attitudes tests allow for the inference that
individuals who believe they hold no negative racial prejudice
nonetheless harbor such attitudes as the result of social conditioning and cultural or other experiential factors. While sharing
the unintentionality of cognitive biases, implicit attitudes can be
seen as closer to overt discrimination in that they reflect learned
behavior or the suppression of previously held overt attitudes.30
They may also be confirmation of the cognitive bias effect, reflecting the inevitable progression of cognitive-based stereotypes or schemas into implicit attitudes. Either way, implicit
attitudes present a second way of capturing the subtle force that
continues to operate in the post-Brown era.
Implicit Association Tests (hereinafter “IAT”) are a method
of indirectly measuring the strengths of associations among concepts.31 IATs are presented on web-based computer interfaces
in which instances of four concepts must be sorted using only
two options, each of which is assigned to two concepts.32 The
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IAT rationale is that people will find it easier to sort a pair of
concepts when they are closely associated than when they are
weakly associated. Ease of sorting is indexed both by the speed
of responding and the frequency of errors, where faster responding and fewer errors indicate stronger associations. Basically, if
you respond faster when “white” and “good” are paired than
when “black” and “good” are paired, your score would reflect a
preference for whites.33
Immediately prior to taking the IAT, subjects are asked to
complete a short questionnaire asking about their explicit preferences among the concepts used in the upcoming IAT and including basic demographic information.34 In this way, IATs are able
to compare conscious, explicit attitudes against unconscious,
implicit ones. One study, conducted on the original IAT website
between October 1998 and April 2000, consisted of 541,696
interpretable tests,35 of which approximately 221,000 responses
were black-white racial attitudes tests (both name and facebased).36 Analysis of the preference among test takers found
that 73% of test-takers automatically favor white over black, and
as many as 88% of test-takers showed either pro-white or antiblack preferences.37 On the explicit measure, whites showed a
preference for white over black, but black respondents showed
an even stronger preference for black over white. However, on
the implicit measure, whites showed a strong preference
(significantly stronger than the magnitude of explicit preference)
for white, while black respondents showed a weak preference
for white over black.38
New studies that place the IAT in various contextual settings supplement the notion of environmental factors as the
source of implicit attitudes and raise possibilities as to how we
can combat the effects of these biases. Studies have shown that
situational factors, like receiving the IAT from a black experimenter or being shown pictures of, or made to think about, admired black individuals like Martin Luther King, Jr., Michael
Jordan, and Bill Cosby, can lower bias scores.39 Similarly, testtakers display reduced implicit gender biases when asked to reflect beforehand on certain questions, like “What are strong
women like?”40
In terms of implications on actual behavior, one study found
that those test-takers who showed the strongest implicit racial
biases, when given the option of working with a white or black
partner, tended to choose a white partner. Another experiment
found that those who showed strong implicit preference for heterosexuals over homosexuals were more likely to avoid eye contact and show signs of unfriendliness when introduced to someone who they were told was gay. Finally, a German study found
that volunteers whose results suggested more bias against Turks
(an immigrant group in Germany) were more likely to find a
Turkish suspect guilty when asked to make a judgment about
criminality in an ambiguous situation.41
While critics of both cognitive bias and implicit association
theories exist, these studies are oft-repeated and consistent with
traditional laboratory findings.42 Moreover, in analyzing the
results of various experiments simulating different hiring-related
23

decisions, their explanatory power is tremendous. For example,
in 2003, Bertrand and Mullainathan conducted a now-famous
study in which Boston and Chicago-area employers were sent
fictitious resumes that were identical except for interchanging
African-American and white applicant names.43 The study
found that applicants with white-sounding names received fifty
percent more callbacks from potential employers.44 Another
famous study analyzed the hiring practices at eight leading orchestras dating back to the 1960s.45 In response to concerns of
gender bias in hiring, many orchestras in the 1970s and 1980s
shifted from conductors hand-picking new members to a blind
jury-selection process in which applicants performed behind a
screen in order to conceal their identity, creating a unique opportunity to test for gender-biased hiring. The use of the screen led
to a 50% increase in women advancing out of the preliminary
rounds and a 30% increase in their chances of being hired in the
final rounds.46
Although interconnected, it is important to recognize that
the source of cognitive biases and implicit associations are presumably different. In one case, it is the cognitive processes that
are considered healthy and crucial; in the other, it is the absorption of cultural and situational norms. Together, they demand a
shift in focus from our words and thoughts to our subconscious
motivations. Moreover, the force of cognitive biases is particularly powerful because of where this manifestation occurs: at the
subconscious level. Greater esteem is achieved for a subordinating group when it can deny the act of subordinating, making its
status appear innate or natural, as opposed to constructed.
IMPACT OF SUBCONSCIOUS BIAS ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
By placing the operation of force, at least in part, at the cognitive level and recognizing that even individuals who do not
intend to discriminate are nonetheless influenced by implicit
biases, it is possible to argue that discrimination is not the exception but the rule in today’s workplace. Decisions in which
ambiguity and subjectivity are abundant are highly susceptible
to the influence of bias. In the employment setting, subjective
decision making is commonplace. So, how much discrimination
occurs in the workplace?
Survey data on personal experiences with employment discrimination suggest that while discriminators may not recognize
that their decisions are clouded by subtle, subconscious biases,
victims do. According to national Gallup polls, the percentage
of African Americans reporting that they were discriminated
against “at [their] place of work within the last 30 days varied
between 21% and 18% for the years 1997 through 2001.”47
Thirty-three percent of African Americans and Latinos reported
that at least one time at their job, they were not offered a job that
a white person got because of racial discrimination, and thirtyone percent reported being passed over for a promotion that was
offered to a white person because of racial discrimination.48
Researchers at Rutgers University conducted a 2002 study
focused specifically on employees and found that 10% of em24

ployees said they had been “treated unfairly at their workplace
because of their race or ethnicity.” Among this group, 28% reported being passed over for promotion, 21% reported being
assigned undesirable tasks, and 16% reported hearing racist
comments. Among African Americans, over half of those surveyed “knew of” discrimination in the workplace in the last
year, and 28% had themselves experienced racial discrimination
in the last year. Given the pervasive nature of subtle forms of
discrimination and the tiny percentage of employees perceiving
discrimination who actually file claims, one begins to wonder
not why there are so many employment discrimination claims
but why there are so few.49
Admittedly, other scholars have considered the meaning of
these subtle forms of discrimination on employment relationships and the surrounding legal regime.50 My effort here is to
place these ideas within a more comprehensive framework for
understanding how discrimination operates in our society. More
narrowly, I hope these studies rebut the fallacy of Epstein’s
force-free, post-Brown America.

MARKET FORCE: HOW BUSINESS CYCLES
EXERT DISCRIMINATORY FORCE
Here, my endeavor is to consider the relationship between
market fluctuations and other force phenomena, including the
subtle biases discussed above. The employment setting is an apt
one for the study of force. For one, it is an area in which discriminatory behavior has been historically pervasive. Moreover,
the plethora of data and statistics available for study provide a
practical reason for studying employment discrimination.
By way of background, in order for a complaint of discrimination to become a lawsuit in federal court, an employee must
first file a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). After a brief investigation, the
EEOC determines whether a case is worth pursuing. If so, it
may work with the parties to obtain a settlement or sue on behalf
of the employee. In all other cases, the EEOC issues a “right to
sue” letter to the employee, at which point an aggrieved employee can file a lawsuit in federal court.51 Thus, the two major
sources of data are the EEOC’s Annual Charge Statistics and the
Judicial Facts and Figures maintained by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts.52
The intuition regarding the relationship between business
cycles and employment discrimination is simple: when unemployment rates are low, jobs are available in abundance, so employees who experience discrimination have attractive alternatives to litigation; when unemployment rates are high, jobs are
scarce and employees will stay put in a discriminatory work
setting, at least for a while. Meanwhile, employers concerned
about turnover and associated costs have fewer incentives to
prevent such treatment during periods of high unemployment,
when they can easily find attractive candidates to replace aggrieved employees. A separate factor supporting this expected
effect is that periods of greater unemployment will inevitably be
accompanied by a greater number of discrimination-inducing
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events – that is, layoffs and firings.53
Economists John Donohue III and Peter Siegelman conducted a comprehensive empirical study of the explanations for
fluctuations in the amount of employment discrimination litigation, based on data from 1970-1989.54 In part, Donohue and
Siegelman were trying to understand why employment discrimination lawsuits in federal court grew 2166% from 1970-1989
while the general civil caseload only grew only 125% over the
same period. As an initial matter, they found that the volume of
employment discrimination displayed two patterns: (1) a general
upward trend in the long- term, and (2) erratic fluctuations
around this trend in the short-term.55 They also found that the
combination of upward trend over time and the lagged unemployment rates explained 96% of the variance in the number of
suits.56
Applying a similar series of regressions to quantify the impact of various factors likely to contribute to the long-term, upward trend,57 Donohue and Siegelman concluded that almost
20% of the increased volume of employment discrimination
litigation over the period from 1970-1989 could be explained by
rising unemployment.58
In one sense, unemployment rates themselves contain a
racially discriminatory component. Research shows that nonwhite workers experience a significantly higher rate of unemployment than white workers. Unemployment rates among African Americans and Latinos are consistently higher than for
whites, and African Americans in particular have consistently
experienced approximately twice the level of unemployment as
whites.59 In this way, unemployment rates exert market force
through their inherently racially-disparate functioning. In the
following section, I delve deeper into market operations to consider how shifts in the unemployment rate may catalyze and
exert force. .
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND EMPLOYER
BEHAVIOR AS FORCE
As economists acknowledge, weak labor markets may create an incentive for employers to “indulge in discriminatory
preferences” as a result of the excess supply of labor, with an
available pool of workers that presumably includes many talented and qualified workers. Employers may also see economic
downturns as an opportunity to weed out minority employees
who they perceive as underperforming or problematic by urging
them to quit. Economists question this incentive by pointing to
the high cost of firing, suggesting that the costs of potential employment discrimination litigation create a disincentive to behave in a discriminatory manner, and thus neutralize the labor
availability effect.60 However, this theory rests on the assumption that a significant portion of individuals who are discriminated against will actually bring claims. The assumption is
hasty.
In the Rutgers survey, discussed in Part II, supra, 34% of
those who reported racial discrimination in the workplace did
not do anything, and only 3% said that they actually sued their
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company or co-worker. Among African Americans who perceived discrimination, less than 1% (0.85%) actually filed a formal complaint with the EEOC, and less than one quarter of one
percent (0.22%) actually file a federal lawsuit.61 Indeed, an employer seeking to push people out could be quite successful in
doing so without facing a lawsuit: at least four times as many
people will quit than file a formal complaint with the EEOC,
and 16 times as many will quit than file a suit in federal court.62
Donohue and Siegelman engage in an extensive analysis of
EEOC and federal court data to address the possibility of increased employer discrimination during periods of high unemployment.63 They conclude that no such rise in discriminatory
behavior occurs among employers.64 In support of their conclusion, Donohue and Siegelman identify several empirical findings that contradict the causality of employer behavior. First,
they posit that the federal government would not experience
incentives to discriminate in the way private employers would,
and thus data showing that suits against the federal government
follow the same unemployment-related pattern as suits against
private employers can only be attributed to the worker benefits
effect.65 Second, they note that the upswing in employment
litigation begins within one or two quarters of the economic
downturn, though it usually takes longer to satisfy the administrative and procedural requirements for filing suit in federal
court, suggesting that increased federal court filings are based
on complaints filed with the EEOC prior to the upswing in unemployment rates (and any associated increase in employer discrimination).66 Third, they find that while the number of federal
court filings increase in recessions, the number of EEOC
charges remains relatively constant, a pattern inconsistent with
increased employer discrimination.67
Having laid out their argument against increased employer
discrimination, Donohue and Siegelman go on to hypothesize as
to the empirical results one may expect to find as a result of a
worker benefits effect, eventually showing that the predicted
results do indeed occur. Under a worker benefits effect, periods
of higher unemployment lead to increased durations of unemployment, and therefore greater backpay awards. Larger damage awards result not only in the established increase in litigation, but also make cases with a lower probability of success
more attractive by increasing the possible rewards of successful
litigation. Indeed, looking at figures from the same period,
Donohue and Siegelman find a small decrease in plaintiff win
rates and larger damages awards as unemployment rates rise.68
In sum, Donohue and Siegelman create a seemingly impenetrable argument rejecting the employer behavior effect and lending
strong support for a worker benefits effect.69
Nonetheless, I advocate for caution in interpreting their
findings. While the strength of their argument rests in its reliance on empirical support from employment litigation data, so
too may its weakness. I argue that documented evidence of judicial hostility to employment discrimination litigation may very
well poison the well of federal court data used in their findings.
This hostility calls for a reinterpretation of their data to consider
25

the possibility of increased employer discrimination during economic downturns.
MARKET FORCE AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
The worker benefits effect essentially argues that, in economic downturns, relatively little changes besides the cost calculus of employees. Even assuming this is true, I argue that the
worker benefits effect should be understood within the rubric of
force. The fact that longer durations of unemployment make it
more economically viable to bring a claim does not, in and of
itself, imply that employees are bringing weaker or more frivolous claims. Indeed, the very nature of backpay awards creates a
wage threshold whereby high-earning victims of discrimination
are more likely to find it worthwhile to sue than low-earning
workers. The marginally lower-earning worker whose claim is
made worthwhile by the increased length of unemployment is no
less meritorious. Instead, valuing a discrimination claim based
on the length of unemployment, rather than the actual discriminatory conduct, merely highlights the unfortunate impact – call
it force – on low-wage victims of discrimination as a result of a
backpay-based remedy structure. After presenting evidence of
judicial hostility in the next section, I consider whether victims
of discrimination are penalized for bringing their claims during
periods of high unemployment .

JUDICIAL HOSTILITY TO EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
In 1997, the Second Circuit instituted a task force to study
the issue of gender, racial, and ethnic fairness in its courts.70
Generally, the task force began by surveying judges, court employees and attorneys about their observations of gender, racial,
and ethnic bias in the courthouse. In regards to bias directed at
attorneys, the survey found that judges observed almost no racial or ethnic bias against minority attorneys, an observation
shared by white male and white female courtroom employees.71
Among minority law clerks and courtroom deputies, on the
other hand, 24% reported observing a minority attorney's competence challenged because of his or her race or ethnicity, and
19% report observing a minority attorney mistaken for a nonattorney.72 Among minority attorneys, 39% reported that they
"often" or "occasionally" observed various kinds of incidents of
racial or ethnic bias directed at minority attorneys, including
derogatory racial or ethnic comments; 46% reported being ignored, interrupted, or not listened to; and 52% had been mistaken for a non-attorney.73
As previously noted, employment discrimination litigation
in federal court increased by 2166% from 1970-1989, versus a
125% increase in the overall civil caseload. Between 1992 and
1997, the volume of discrimination cases nearly doubled.74
Meanwhile, judicial attitudes toward employment discrimination
litigation reflect what can only be described as disgust. In a
1994 New York Times article, a former federal judge complained
that discrimination cases are an unjustifiable consumer of judicial time because they are “rarely settled, are characterized by
26

high levels of acrimony and subjective claims of victimization;
they are immensely time consuming and are controlled by legal
standards that, lacking sufficient precision, are overgeneralized
and of marginal use.”75 The Second Circuit Task Force found
that other judges privately agreed that the Times’ article captured the views of colleagues who felt the cases were "small
potatoes," clogging up the federal courts and diverting judges'
attention from larger, purportedly more significant, civil cases.76
Statistically, in the few employment discrimination cases
that do make it to trial,77 plaintiffs are almost twice as likely to
win before a jury as they are in a bench trial.78 From 1990 to
2001, plaintiffs’ win rates before juries ranged from 36-44%
while win rates before judges ranged from 14-33%.79 Despite
plaintiffs’ minimal chances of making it to trial and obtaining a
favorable decision, they fair even worse on appeal. In fact, the
differential between plaintiff and defendant success rates is
greater in employment discrimination cases than any other category of civil cases.80 When an employment discrimination defendant wins at trial and the case is reviewed on appeal, only
5.8% of those judgments are reversed. By contrast, when an
employment discrimination plaintiff wins at trial and the case is
reviewed on appeal, 43.61% of those judgments are reversed.81
Looking solely at post-verdict defense motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, proceedings with historically low
rates of success, five out of six such appeals resulted in reversals
in the Second Circuit from 1992 through 1995.82
In a sense, these results are not surprising. There is little
reason to believe that federal judges, who are predominantly
white and the majority of whom are men, are any less susceptible than the general population to cognitive or implicit biases in
decision making. Perhaps, part of the problem can be attributed
to a legal regime that is too onerous on plaintiffs and inconsistent with the realities of modern discrimination. In sum, anecdotal evidence of judicial attitudes, lower win percentages at
trial before judges than juries, and the widespread perception of
bias among minority employees (and attorneys), all evince a
certain judicial hostility toward employment discrimination
claims.
A CRITIQUE OF DONAHUE AND SIEGELMAN
Donohue and Siegelman fail to account for evidence of the
increasingly aggressive use of summary judgment by defendants
in the area of employment discrimination.83 In light of the evidence discussed above, summary judgment effectively precludes
the jury’s opportunity to perform its traditional duty while simultaneously transferring authority to hostile judicial decisionmakers.
Donohue and Siegelman argue that increased rates of settlement and decreased plaintiff win rates at trial during periods of
high unemployment lend support to the worker benefits effect.84
Assuming as they do that “weaker” claims (defined as those
with lower probabilities of success) represent the majority of
additional cases during market downturns, and that weak claims
are likely to settle, increased rates of settlement and lower win
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rates at trial support their theory.85 However, given the growing
success of employer motions for summary judgment, in conjunction with the proposal that the incremental, or additional,
recessionary claim is weaker, employers should seek and win a
greater number of summary judgment claims. Therefore, a better test of whether weaker claims are brought during recessions
would study whether rates of summary judgment increased during periods of high unemployment.86 Correspondingly, rates of
settlement should have a smaller, or negligible, correlation with
high unemployment. Any actual increase in settlements, then,
or findings showing a lack of correlation between summary
judgment and increased unemployment, may instead reflect a
greater quantity or magnitude of employer discrimination.87
Similarly, we know it is a rare employment discrimination plaintiff who refuses settlement, overcomes a motion for summary
judgment and makes it to trial;88 presumably even rarer would
be such a result for one who brings an incrementally “weaker”
claim during a period of high unemployment. Among the few
cases that make it to trial, then, the win rates should remain relatively constant. Lower plaintiff win rates, in turn, may reflect
judicial animosity.89
One may be skeptical of the idea that judges are intentionally hostile to claims of discrimination, but subtle biases provide
a way of understanding observed judicial hostility to employment discrimination litigation as the result of subconscious influences. Unlike cell phones and cameras, subconscious biases
are not checked at the courthouse door. In fact, the differing
perceptions of discrimination toward minority employees by
white versus minority employees in the workplace90 are consistent with the differing perceptions of discrimination towards
minority attorneys by white versus minority attorneys and courtroom employees in the courthouse.91 Indeed, law clerks and
courtroom employees identified behaviors that would reflect the
operation of categorization-induced biases and negative schemas, including challenges to the competence of minority attorneys and mistaken assumptions that they were non-attorneys.
The intentional-sounding theory presented previously, in
which employers increase discriminatory force during periods of
high unemployment, can be presented in nonmotivational terms.
Employers seeking to make workforce reductions in order to
take advantage of the large labor pool will likely seek to push
out those who are seen as difficult or as underperformers.
Again, this determination itself would be influenced by previous
judgments contaminated by subtle biases. In a recession, choosing whom to terminate among a group of adequately performing
individuals introduces greater ambiguity, and hence greater susceptibility to the effects of cognitive biases. Finally, subtle biases may also interact with market forces through the behavior
of co-workers. Innate ingroup preferences are likely to serve an
unknowing status-producing end among white employees, such
that individuals who are socially isolated from their work teams,
who are more likely to be outgroup employees, would be most
vulnerable.
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These dynamics, if associated with market downturns, could
cast doubt on Donohue and Siegelman’s findings. For example,
employer behavior in market downturns may place increased
pressure on a set of vulnerable employees without increasing the
number of total employees subject to discrimination, explaining
the lack of cyclicality in EEOC charges. Similarly, employers
may take small steps to reduce costs or take advantage of increased labor in anticipation of market downturns and associated increases in unemployment. If so, the upturn in employment litigation within only two quarters after the onset of market
downturns92 may be consistent with increased employer discrimination. While these dynamics present a rebuttal to
Donohue and Siegelman, when understood in full they present a
way of understanding the relationship between subtle biases,
employer behavior and market conditions.

A FORCE-BASED PRESCRIPTION
Through cognitive and implicit biases, we learn that negative racial attitudes are pervasive and affect decision-making on
all levels, even among those who genuinely believe they are
acting in a race-neutral manner. The employment setting,
wrought with ambiguous and subjective decision making at all
stages of interracial interactions, from hiring to firing, raises
basic questions about the sort of remedy, and proof structure,
that should be implemented to combat such discrimination.
The two major frameworks used to argue workplace discrimination claims are disparate treatment and disparate impact.
Under disparate treatment, an employee must prove that the employer’s decision was motivated by a racially discriminatory
purpose. Under disparate impact, employees can forgo a showing of discriminatory purpose by identifying a facially-neutral
employment policy that has a disproportionate impact, or effect,
on racial minorities.93 In practice, neither adequately captures
the operation of subtle forms of force. Disparate treatment, with
its focus on intent, or purpose, is immediately deficient. Moreover, its traditional proof structure requires the identification of
a similarly situated member of another race who was treated
differently. Yet cognitive biases teach us that employers, unknowingly, may perceive differences in qualifications or performance between two virtually identical, or “similarly situated”
individuals as a result of ingroup versus outgroup status. This
difference will then be articulated as a challenge to the employee’s attempt to identify a similarly situated individual.
Disparate impact seems better suited to remedy discrimination rooted in the subconscious because of its substitution of
effect for intent. However, disparate impact theory, as applied
currently, is also problematic. First, it requires the identification
of a specific, facially-neutral policy or practice that constitutes
the source of the disparate impact. Decisions infused with biassusceptible subjectivity do not easily lend themselves to this
causal attribution. We are not talking about an employer policy
that says all employees must live within a two mile radius of
work; we are talking about interviews, performance reviews,
and everyday interactions that are capable of producing system27

atically-biased outcomes. Second, even if a causal relationship
between a specific practice and a racially disparate outcome can
be established, courts are likely to be extremely reluctant to tell
an employer that they cannot engage in many of these practices,
especially if the employer can prove that the practice is consistent with business necessity.
I argue for a bias-sensitive theory of discrimination in
which disparate treatment still provides the basic framework but
where the focus shifts from establishing that there was a discriminatory purpose to establishing that discriminatory biases,
explicit or implicit, permeated the employer’s decision. In the
process, evidence of racially disproportionate outcomes, divorced from any particular practices, could constitute a single
relevant factor in attempting to prove the role of force in decision making. The crucial components, however, are the relevant
facts and the inferences that can be drawn from them.94
By presenting a more accurate picture of how discrimination operates, force theory’s most useful contribution may be in
providing guidance as to what facts are relevant and what
weight should be given to each. For example, the cognitive bias
studies discussed above suggest that cases involving minority
employees who are in predominantly homogeneous groups,
where they are “token” members of their race, should raise red
flags. These employees are more likely to be victims of ingroup
preferences, are more likely to be judged negatively for ambiguous actions, and are more likely to be judged harshly for relatively minor performance deficiencies. Similarly, regardless of
the racial composition of the workplace, ingroup preferences
will often be proxied by particular negative assessments of outgroup employees. For example, social isolation caused by ingroup preferences may be seen as “not being a team player.” In
addition, the overall market conditions and unemployment rate
may also provide useful contextual information about the force
at play in the workplace at the time of relevant decision making.
Similarly, cognitive biases suggest that certain inferences
and presumptions should be given little or no weight in assessing whether force contaminated an employment decision. For
example, because studies show that outgroup members are more
likely to be judged in extremes, both positively and negatively, a
few highly-placed African American executives within a company would provide little evidence of non-discriminatory decision making. Similarly, evidence of bias in mental processing
would advocate for the abolition of the “same actor” presumption, a judicially-created legal standard holding that “where the
hirer and the firer are the same individual and the termination of
employment occurs within a relatively short time span following
the hiring, a strong inference exists that discrimination was not a
determining factor for the adverse action taken by the employer.”95 As a result of cognitive biases, it is perfectly plausible that a hirer would recruit a minority employee and then later
judge that individual negatively in various ambiguous situations
because of unknowing biases. Or, upon a single perceived deficiency or error by a minority employee, the hirer may subconsciously reorient the minority employee within a negative racial
28

schema that he had previously thought the employee transcended on the basis of her application or interview. In turn,
from that point forth, ambiguous situations are more likely to be
understood in a schema-consistent way and these schemaconsistent activities are more likely than schema-inconsistent
activities to be recalled by the hirer when making later firing,
promotion and demotion decisions. By presenting a more complicated picture of decision making, where subconscious considerations influence determinations, inferential shortcuts require
questioning.
Where factual circumstances play such an important role,
factfinders should be armed with the tools to properly weigh
relevant evidence. By training federal judges on their own hostility to employment litigation, statistical evidence of the prevalence of employment discrimination, and the impact of cognitive
biases on decision making, judges may be in a better position to
determine whether context-providing facts are relevant. For
example, courts may need to allow for more scrutinizing review
of past performance, placing a greater burden on employers to
justify negative determinations based on ambiguous conduct. In
addition, minority plaintiffs may be able to support an inference
of bias by applying the common disparate treatment strategy of
identifying ingroup members who were “similarly situated” but
treated differently (more favorably). Courts, in turn, must recognize the role of subtle biases in shaping the very determination of whether a given ingroup member was actually “similarly
situated.” As an example, an employer will likely deny that two
employees are similarly situated by citing the minority employee’s greater number of warnings/reprimands, or by identifying more negative performance evaluations. Yet, the differing
patterns of behavior may be nothing more than manifestations of
the employer’s subconscious biases. Therefore, courts should
engage in a thorough review of past actions that constitute negative assessments to determine whether biases have contaminated
employers’ very evidence of nondiscrimination. Similarly, coworker testimony as to these previous disputes may prove informative (and could warrant more or less weight depending on
ingroup or outgroup status, for example). Finally, the strikingly
common use of summary judgment is particularly disturbing, as
the notion of force illustrates that factual circumstances in the
employment setting are both complicated and conceptually crucial.
In the section above, I have tried to present some of the
implications of a broader notion of force on the current employment discrimination legal regime. Specifically, subconscious
biases and their relationship to judicial hostility present numerous concerns as to the type of inferences that can accurately be
made in interpreting fact patterns and the ability of legal decision makers - both judges and juries - to avoid the influence of
the very same biases they are tasked with assessing.
FORCE AND ROLE OF THE STATE
By engaging Epstein on the utility of the antidiscrimination
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are treated as an army of “private attorneys general.”99 Where
litigation is costly and the problem of discrimination is pervasive, placing the onus on businesses would serve to level the
playing field by at least aligning burden with resources.100

laws, a basic question arises as to the role of the state in regulating racially discriminatory conduct. Epstein’s approach is basically that of the laissez faire capitalist, arguing for a hands-off
approach in which discrimination will largely be eliminated by
markets because of the costs of discriminating. Under this approach, the Jim Crow South was an artificial construct and
Brown v. Board of Education was the normalizing event that, by
eliminating the state-sponsored exertion of discriminatory force,
returned markets to their “natural” state. The natural order restored, markets are poised to do their noble work of eliminating
inefficiencies and growing the pie.
The rubric of force presents a different view. Regardless of
whether a return to a state of nature can be achieved, the force
notion compels the view that such a state does not currently exist. Instead, implicit biases suggest that pre-Brown attitudes
may have found a new home in the subconscious. Cognitive
biases support this theory and further suggest that, at least as
long as there are identifiable ingroup and outgroup members, a
force-free state of nature may never exist.
As a final point, a view of subtle biases as potentially omnipresent suggests that, because of a dearth of truly objective actors, a seismic realignment of the current legal regime may be
needed. Where all employment decisions involving racial minorities are reasonably likely to be infected with racial bias,96
perhaps the presumption of nondiscrimination and the burden of
proof should be reversed. Indeed, the United States is in the
minority in its use of the at-will employment presumption.97
Canada bars dismissals that are “unjust” or not supported by
“just cause,” and nearly all European countries place a similar
burden of good cause for dismissal on employers.98
The force notion raises questions about the viability of a
model that shifts responsibility from the state to workers, who

CONCLUSION
Legal philosopher Robert Hale argues that coercive force is not
created through the application of government regulation or the
adoption of any particular legal rule. Rather, the total amount of
coercion remains constant while its distribution is shifted.101 For
example, the choice of a particular rule of property, while enhancing the rights of the property holder, simultaneously places
a restriction on the use of that property for all others. Contrary
to the suggestion by free market advocates that state regulation
is the creation of coercion upon private parties, in reality these
free market proponents simply advocate for a state of affairs in
which the balance of coercion is struck at one extreme, which
inevitably favors those with the most capital. While the capitalists run amok, racial minorities are subject to the coercive force
of history, culture, and cognition.
In the employment discrimination setting, antidiscrimination laws ensure that the balance is not set at the free
marketers’ extreme, but racial minorities nonetheless labor under too heavy a burden. Vulnerable to the cognitive bias and
implicit attitudes of employers, the current balance places the
onus on victims of racial discrimination to police what is a pervasive societal ill, permeating our collective subconscious, with
little help. The status quo asks racial minorities who suffer discrimination in the workplace to seek redress in an unknowingly
hostile judicial forum through the use of a set of clumsy legal
rules that misunderstand the nature of the problem. If equality is
a goal that our society values, a new balance must be struck.
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